Members of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security reached out to Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary, requesting a comprehensive threat assessment concerning the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) expanding intelligence and security collaboration with the Republic of Cuba (Cuba). At least four PRC-linked signals intelligence facilities have been established in Cuba, just 90 miles off the coast of Florida.
“The security risks posed by these developments are particularly acute across the air, space, and maritime domains,” Mark E. Green, a Republican representative from Tennessee and House Committee on Homeland Security chairman, John Moolenaar, a Republican from Michigan and Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party chairman, Carlos Gimenez, a Florida Republican and subcommittee on transportation and maritime security chairman, Sheri Biggs, a South Carolina Republican representative and Eli Crane, an Arizona Republican representative wrote in a letter to Noem. “By fusing telemetry interception, geospatial intelligence collection, and electromagnetic surveillance, the PRC is positioning itself to systematically erode U.S. strategic advantages without ever firing a shot.”
They highlighted that the geographic proximity of suspected PRC-linked facilities in Cuba to sensitive U.S. installations, including Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, Kennedy Space Center, Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, and Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, may enable the PRC to monitor American detection and response capabilities, map electronic profiles of U.S. assets, and prepare the electromagnetic environment for potential future exploitation.
The letter also referenced recent congressional testimony from General Dan ‘Razin’ Caine, President Donald Trump’s newly confirmed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further underscoring the seriousness of the threat. General Caine stated that the U.S. Cyber Command’s hunt-forward operations, which deploy at the invitation of foreign governments, have uncovered PRC malware implanted within Latin American networks.
These discoveries within the U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility reinforces longstanding concerns about the PRC’s malign cyber activity in the Western Hemisphere. Notably, reports of PRC technicians and advisors frequenting known or suspected intelligence sites in Cuba, suggests ongoing operational activity that merits sustained scrutiny by the DHS and the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).
The lawmakers have requested that the DHS provide a classified briefing and a detailed written update addressing several key concerns. First, they seek DHS’s current assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) intelligence-gathering operations in Cuba, including any known or suspected signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities. Second, they request information on any known or suspected infrastructure developments, upgrades, or PRC-linked construction at Cuban military or dual-use facilities.
Third, they ask for details on the Department’s efforts to assess and mitigate risks to the homeland stemming from potential SIGINT interception of communications from DHS components, partner agencies, or U.S. critical infrastructure.
Fourth, they are seeking an evaluation of DHS’s interagency coordination efforts, particularly with the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of State, to monitor, analyze, and counter PRC intelligence and security activities in Cuba, the broader Caribbean, and the Western Hemisphere. This should include an overview of existing mechanisms for information sharing, joint threat assessments, coordinated response planning, and any identified gaps or challenges that could hinder a unified U.S. government response.
Finally, the lawmakers request a summary of the steps DHS has taken to raise awareness among industry and government entities about the risks posed by PRC surveillance platforms operating in or through Cuba.
A July 2024 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identified four Chinese signals intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in Cuba, Bejucal, Wajay, Calabazar, and El Salao, linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While recent satellite imagery from April 2025 shows halted activity and overgrowth at El Salao, significant upgrades continue at Bejucal, including the installation of a circularly disposed antenna array (CDAA) and repositioned satellite dishes, indicating long-range surveillance capabilities. The Calabazar and Wajay sites near Havana remain operational and appear to support the broader SIGINT network.
These developments reflect a strategic expansion of China’s surveillance footprint in the Western Hemisphere, underscoring a long-term asymmetric capability investment close to U.S. territory. This activity also aligns with growing political and economic ties between China and Cuba, including nearly US$8 billion in Chinese financing since 2000. Major projects such as the Port of Santiago de Cuba and a Huawei- and ZTE-built national telecom network—both companies sanctioned by the U.S.—highlight increasing risks of regional communications exposure to PRC-linked technologies.
In March, Republican members of the House Committee on Homeland Security approached the DHS to request information and documents regarding the federal government’s response to extensive cyber intrusions by ‘Volt Typhoon‘ and ‘Salt Typhoon,’ two advanced persistent threat actors supported by the PRC. The members sought information on when DHS and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) first became aware of the threats and damages caused by these intrusions; and asked for a timeline of CISA’s responses to these events.
