Editor’s Note: As we mark International Overdose Awareness Day on August 31, and National Recovery Month in September, Homeland Security Today contributor Robert Patterson – former Acting Administrator for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) – has penned a four-part series to be published weekly. He illuminates the opioid crisis, both its history and ongoing struggles, and how we chart a path forward with strategies that result in tangible impact.
Part 1: Understanding the Historical Context and Criminal Enterprise Evolution
In my 30 years with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and subsequent years working alongside public safety professionals, I have seen no crisis so profoundly affect every aspect of the public safety profession as the opioid epidemic. From 911 centers to first responders in police, fire, and EMS, to the healthcare system, the opioid crisis persists with no clear resolution in sight. Beyond placing acute strain on public safety agencies, this epidemic has brought profound loss to countless families with ripple effects touching every segment of society. This crisis fuels crime, undermines economic instability, and erodes the public’s confidence in community safety.
At the outset of this series, let me be clear: the critical and ongoing efforts of the law enforcement community cannot be overstated. Sustained, methodical investigations and continued disruption of trafficking organizations remain vital to undermining criminal enterprises. These operations strike at the very structure and functioning of illicit networks and are essential components of our response.
However, it is essential to recognize that enforcement alone is not enough. To truly address this problem, we must embrace a broader perspective, question existing narratives, and remain open to new insights. A critical starting point lies in understanding the historical context that has shaped this complex issue.
America’s Drug Crisis Evolution
The 1970s–1980s Foundation
In the 1970s, a significant heroin problem was on public display generally in lower income local neighborhoods across the country. The threat was low-grade heroin, which generally had to be injected. While the growing user base was a crucial problem, one could argue the stigma associated with the necessary use of needles played a major role in the size of this group not accelerating into a much more critical problem. By the 1980s, the new threat centered around cocaine, followed by crack cocaine, both byproducts of the booming coca plant production in South America. Initially glamorized as a drug for the affluent, cocaine abuse grew rapidly, prompting public health awareness campaigns with memorable slogans like “Just Say No” or “This Is Your Brain on Drugs.”
New York City launched campaigns highlighting the impact of drug use, tying it to associated crime, which was increasing the threat not just to public safety, but the greater community. While these programs had positive impacts, at least in raising awareness, heroin addiction continued to be viewed as a localized issue affecting a specific economic demographic, and it didn’t garner the same media attention or public outcry as cocaine.
The 1990s: Colombian Innovation
By the 1990s, the threat had evolved significantly. Colombia, long a major coca producer, began cultivating opium poppy plants. This “new” crop would ultimately allow for the production of high-purity heroin that could be snorted instead of injected. This created two immediate issues: a logistics shift, and a reduced dependency on needles.
While working in the Northeast, particularly areas of the Bronx, New York, I observed heroin distribution not only meeting local demand, but also serving users and criminal groups from Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. At this same time, pharmaceutical opioid problems were growing in areas like Florida and along the Appalachian corridor in states such as Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Ohio.
Some argue that pharmaceutical pills in the mid-to-late 1990s drove the crisis, while Colombian heroin became the second wave years later. I would argue that the two fueled each other almost simultaneously. As one became the focus in any given region, the other emerged as an alternative for the addicted population.
The seriousness of this problem was not lost on federal leadership. Bill Mockler – a driving force behind initiatives such as the DEA’s Kingpin strategy (dismantling the drug trafficking organizations by targeting leadership) and the establishment of the Special Operations Division – devoted significant energy to the Brand Name Heroin program, a strategy that, in many ways, seemingly ran counter to Kingpin. It targeted the networks and distribution chains that were marketing their drugs with distinctive branding on the packaging. Mockler recognized the growing impact of Colombian heroin on U.S. streets and understood not only the importance of looking at the investigative path from a different lens, but also the effort required to make communities safer, prevention and education of both the public and policy makers more effective, and the need to provide relief to those suffering from addiction.
The Criminal Enterprise Evolution
From Colombian Control to Distributed Networks
As U.S. demand for narcotics grew, a parallel set of events unfolded involving the organizations determined to meet and fulfill the supply need. In the 1980s, Colombian criminal groups dominated the cocaine supply chain, from crop production to logistics and distribution within U.S. cities. Their belief was that controlling all aspects of the trade would insulate them from threats and ensure organizational loyalty.
However, this end-to-end model became an Achilles’ heel, as it left the organizations more exposed to investigative efforts, giving law enforcement a significant tactical advantage. As these organizations faced financial losses from seizures and the threat of arrest, they began refining their model.
Soon, Central American, Caribbean, and Mexican criminal groups became increasingly involved in moving drugs across borders and distributing within the United States. Colombian organizations calculated it was better business to sell their product outside the U.S., splintering what was once an end-to-end supply chain into disparate criminal networks. This shift added layers of complexity which challenged both investigators and the networks themselves, but, over the next three decades, these criminal groups only grew larger and more sophisticated.
The Business Acumen of Criminal Organizations
A common misperception is that the individuals who make up these organizations are uneducated. While most may lack formal education, I have often been amazed by their understanding of business principles, from marketing and logistics to pricing, demand, quality control and inventory management.
The emergence of snortable heroin put these skills to use. For example, a single kilogram of heroin could yield roughly $300,000 in profit once distributed, compared to mere thousands for the same weight in cocaine. From a logistics standpoint, pursuing the heroin market made sense.
As the opioid problem grew, some organizations even used information from treatment centers and overdose hotspots to identify potential future markets. As the overprescribing and misuse of pharmaceutical drugs containing opioids such as oxycodone grew, it would further illuminate new areas of opportunity.
An example of their resourcefulness: while working in Central Florida in the early 2000s, the community faced a growing problem with methamphetamine labs. Mexican groups, recognizing the opportunity, began sending pounds of meth alongside their other drugs. When local distributors questioned this, the suppliers instructed them to give it away in areas where small domestic production labs were active. The goal was to identify and build the user base. When it came to illicit heroin, criminal groups benefited from the increase in users resulting from the overprescribing of prescription opioids and took full advantage by providing additional supply.
The Colombian Decline and Prescription Surge
In the early 2000s, the U.S. was still aggressively working with the Colombian government on a number of issues, to include the identification of crop planting and yield potential, as well as associated eradication efforts with both coca and poppy plants. Based on crop forecasts and the potential yields, the U.S. agencies had an ability to, at a minimum, understand the potential supply side of the issue. This exemplified enforcement efforts to move beyond reactive approaches toward predictive and proactive strategies.
What seemed to be good news was that poppy cultivation and resulting heroin production in Colombia declined during the next decade. In 2001, cultivation peaked north of 6500 hectares and, by the end of the decade, it was at an all-time low at just over 1000 hectares. The resulting production of heroin moved from north of 11 metric tons to roughly 2 metric tons in this same time frame.
Colombia’s decline was driven by two factors: aggressive aerial spraying and the funded investment to local farmers to replace these crops with alternatives. The aerial spraying was a far quicker solution to the issue, but it left lasting environmental problems.
However, along with this good news came the next set of issues. The U.S. opioid demand continued rising. With the decline in Colombian-sourced heroin, the next in line to fill this need became a heavy reliance on prescription opioids, which would more than double over this same decade. The end result of this next wave was that, by 2010, it was estimated that more than 11% of adult Americans were using prescription opioids.
Part 2 will examine the emergence of fentanyl, the China connection, the complexities of addressing both supply and demand, and treatment challenges. Part 3 will explore education priorities, political challenges, recent data, the power of partnerships, and the path forward.
